One puzzle concerning highly idealized models is whether they explain. 
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seem to misrepresent reality, and yet appear to be explanatory despite the fact that our best theories of scientific explanation (Woodward, 2003; Strevens, 2008) require faithful representation for successful explanation. For some commentators, one way out of this conundrum is to view these models as providing 'how-possibly explanations' (HPEs hereafter) (Craver, 2006; Forber, 2010; Reydon, 2012; Grüne-Yanoff, 2013a; Bokulich, 2014; Ylikoski and Aydınonat, 2014; Rice, 2016) . They usually contrast HPEs to 'how-actually explanations' (HAEs hereafter), which are accounts of how phenomena actually occurred.
This response, however, raises two sets of issues. First, existing views attribute different features to HPEs. There are two important families of accounts, which I call the Dray-type and the Hempel-type. While the Dray-type (Dray, 1968; Forber, 2010) considers HPEs and HAEs to be a different species of explanation, the Hempel-type (Hempel, 1965; Brandon, 1990; Bokulich, 2014) The second issue concerns the relationship between highly idealized models and HPEs. Many models appear to not depict possibilities, but rather impossibilities (van Riel, 2015) . If this is the case, then how could models possibly provide HPEs if their idealizations can't possibly be true? Spelling out the epistemic contribution of models in terms of HPEs does not constitute genuine progress unless we have a clear idea of how models can indeed provide them.
I aim to provide an account of HPEs that clarifies their nature in the context of solving the puzzle of model-based explanation. More precisely, to address the first issue I argue that the modal notions of 'actuality' and 'possibility' provide the relevant dividing lines between HPEs and HAEs. The crucial feature that distinguishes HAEs from HPEs is neither the type of questions they answer nor the empirical truth of the former and the falsehood of the latter, but instead the sort of knowledge they provide. Whereas HAEs provide knowledge of actual explanations, HPEs provide knowledge of possible explanations. A HAE implies having knowledge about an actual state of affairs, whereas a HPE implies having knowledge of a possible one.
To address the second issue, I emphasize the need to make a distinction between model and world propositions. According to my account, HPEs are world propositions of the form '♦(p because q)'. What model propositions (e.g., unrealistic assumptions) do is to give reasons to believe in the truth of the possibility claim. In other words, they provide evidence for HPEs (cf. Claveau and Vergara Fernández, 2015) . The prima facie issue of viewing models as HPEs dissolves when one properly takes into account the distinction between model and world propositions as well as the evidential relationship between models and explanations.
In section 2 I introduce the two types of HPEs. Section 3 shows why they are inadequate in the context of solving the puzzle of model-based explanation. I develop the account of HPEs as providing knowledge of possible explanations in section 4. In section 5 I spell out in more details what the relationship is between HPEs, models, and explanation. Section 6 concludes.
Two types of HPEs
The notion of 'how-possibly explanation' was introduced by Dray (1957) in his discussion over the adequacy of the deductive-nomological (D-N) model of explanation (Hempel and Oppenheim, 1948) in history.
1 Since Dray, the notion has been revisited many times and the concept was recently used in some discussions over the epistemic contribution of scientific models. Unfortunately, there is now a multitude of concepts on offer and it is now harder than ever to cash out a precise distinction between HAEs and HPEs. Table 1 gives a sense of the various terminology used when the terms are classified into three broad categories. why-necessarily (Dray, 1957) how-possibly (Dray, 1957) would-be explanation (Hindriks, 2013) 'How actually'
'How-possibly' Misc.
true (Hempel, 1965) potential (Hempel, 1965) pseudo-explanation (Resnik, 1991) how-actually (Dray, 1968) possible explanations how-possibly (Dray, 1968) how-plausibly (Machamer et al., 2000) potential how-actually (Reydon, 2012) global how-possibly (Forber, 2010) genuine explanations in need of explananda (Reydon, 2012) possible explanation why-necessarily (Dray, 1968) local how-possibly (Forber, 2010) more or less strongly confirmed (Hempel, 1965) The literature thus far demonstrates that there is a relevant distinction between
HPEs and HAEs; but where and how this distinction is conceived remains a source of contention (cf. Bokulich, 2014) . How are we to make sense of this?
One According to Forber, the dividing line between HAE and HPEs concerns Hempel's problem, not Peirce's. He uses the distinction to argue that since Brandon (1990) answer 'How it could be?' (Dray, 1968) . For him, then, what distinguishes HPEs from HAEs is their different internal conditions: the "two kinds of explanation are logically independent" (Dray, 1957, 167) .
In response to some critics, Dray (1968, 399) raises an interesting distinction between 'possible explanations how-possibly' and 'possible explanations whynecessarily'. This makes clear that not all how-possibly explanations may count as true explanations. HPEs can also be false. Thus, a 'possible explanation how-possibly' is one that meets the internal conditions, but not the external ones.
Likewise, a HAE can also only satisfy the internal conditions. In his terms, it is a 'possible explanation why-necessarily'. 'Possible explanations how-possibly' and 'possible explanations why-necessarily' differ in terms of their internal conditions, but are similar insofar as they both do not meet the external conditions. For
Dray, a HPE has to offer a true necessary condition. A HPE that would offer a false or irrelevant one would only be a 'possible explanation how-possibly'.
Forber (2010) (Hempel, 1965, 428 explanations (Hempel, 1965, 338) . A 'potential' explanation is defined as "any argument that has the character of a D-N explanation except that the sentences constituting its explanans need not be true" (ibid.). That is to say, it is an explanation that satisfies the internal conditions, but not the external ones-i.e., the explanans is false or not known to be true. A 'true' D-N explanation is one that meets both the internal and external conditions.
Hempel rejected the assertion that HPEs were a distinct species of explanation and therefore did not believe it was necessary to characterize them further. Even though some accounts (Salmon, 1989; Brandon, 1990; Craver, 2006 ; see also Bokulich, 2014) Craver maintains that how-possibly models "are purported to explain, but they are only loosely constrained conjectures about the mechanism that produces the explanandum phenomenon" (2006, 361) . In these two cases, the use of HPEs is closer to the Hempel-type than to Dray. HPEs are not so much different types of explanation than ones not meeting the external conditions.
But is it not only a language problem? What is really at stake if scholars misidentify 'potential' explanations as 'how-possibly' explanations? The problem is that the confusion occurs not only at the semantic level. In many debates on theoretical models, the concept of HPE is mobilized to account for their epistemic contribution (Brandon, 1990; Cooper, 1996; Craver, 2006; Aydınonat, 2007; Grüne-Yanoff, 2013b,a; Rohwer and Rice, 2013; Bokulich, 2014; Ylikoski and Aydınonat, 2014; Rice, 2016) . Unfortunately, the lack of a clear and shared account of HPEs makes resorting to them a shaky strategy. The following example illustrates the kind of issues we often encounter.
For instance, Rohwer and Rice (2013) argue that the Hawk-Dove model (May-nard Smith and Price, 1973; Smith, 1982) is "explanatory" and provides "understanding". It does so, according to them, even though it is not an explanation.
It is explanatory and provides understanding, they say, because "the model is still able to answer certain key how-possibly questions (Resnik, 1991; Forber, 2010; Reydon, 2012) " (Rohwer and Rice, 2013, 349) . In all fairness, Rohwer and However, what I want to show is that neither the Dray-type nor the Hempel-type are fully adequate. To do so, it suffices to briefly consider the case of Schelling's (1971; 1978) checkerboard model of residential segregation. The most popular interpretation of the model is that it provides a sort of HPE (Aydınonat, 2007; Grüne-Yanoff, 2013a; Weisberg, 2013; Ylikoski and Aydınonat, 2014) . Weisberg (2013, (118) (119) summarizes as follows the question the model raises and answers:
"In other words, how is it possible for segregation to happen in a city without collective preferences for segregation? The answer is that this is possible when every individual has a small preference for similar neighbors and tries to satisfy this preference".
The model is not strictly speaking a Hempel-type potential explanation because it goes beyond meeting the internal conditions. The model does not only tell us how certain consequences can be derived. When considering the model, "we see it is possible that preferences for not living in a minority status bring about segregation. But that it is possible does not imply that it actually happens in this way. This is therefore different from offering a merely internally correct explanation and from providing a HAE. Furthermore, there is a prima facie puzzle on the standard reading of the Hempel-type since it was not developed to deal with the idealizations models typically contain. Laws of nature can be true or false, but we can't really say the same of models (Reiss, 2012) . It is therefore unclear how the external conditions of the Hempel-type relate to models.
It is also not a Dray-type HPE for two different reasons. Firstly, what the model refutes is not the belief that residential segregation could not happen.
The impossibility does not concern the explanandum, but rather the explanans.
It was considered unlikely, if not impossible, that something other than strong discriminatory preferences could bring about residential segregation (Clark and Fossett, 2008) . As Grüne-Yanoff (2009) argues, the checkerboard model contradicts this belief. But no one had any reason to disbelieve that segregation exists or that it could happen. Secondly, since the checkerboard model does not identify actual necessary conditions for residential segregation, it would constitute a 'possible explanation how-possibly' (see Dray, 1968) , not a HPE.
Since the causal factors identified in the checkerboard model are at best sufficient for segregation-not necessary-and are not known to be actual, then it would only satisfy the internal conditions for a Dray-type HPE, but not the external ones. There might be other instances of segregation where these causal factors are not present.
The internal and external conditions of HPEs
What I take to be the distinguishing characteristic of HPEs is the modal information they convey. This appears to be a feature that both proponents of Dray-type and Hempel-type HPEs emphasize, albeit while not explicitly appealing to it.
Consider the following quotations from commentators on diverse sides of the debate (emphases in original).
What we know seems to rule out the possibility of the occurrence which is to be explained. The explanation consists in showing that in spite of appearances to the contrary, it is not an impossible one after all (Dray, 1957, 161) .
We use the notion of a potential explanation, for example, when we ask whether a novel and as yet untested law or theory would provide an explanation for some empirical phenomenon [. . . ] (Hempel, 1965, 338) .
What good is a speculative how-possibly explanation? The short answer is: it shows how known evolutionary mechanisms could produce known phenomena (Brandon, 1990, 180) .
They [how-possibly models] describe how a set of parts and activities might be organized such that they exhibit the explanandum phenomenon (Craver, 2006, 361) .
In contrast, how-possibly explanations aim to explain how some event could possibly occur (Forber, 2010, 33) .
The Hawk-Dove game is intended to show how individual selection could possibly produce this behavior in a wide range of populations (Rice, 2016, 92) .
All the preceding quotes suggest that HPEs have something to do with the modality of the explanation. The use of words like 'might', 'could', and 'possibility' are all modal terms. It is interesting to see that regardless of one's specific position in the debate over HPEs, a common idea is that HPEs provide modal information. What I take to be the defining feature of HPEs is therefore not the type of question they answer nor their degree of empirical confirmation, but rather that they contribute to our knowledge of the possibility of certain states of affairs. HAEs, on the contrary, contribute to our knowledge of what is actually the case. Using this demarcation criterion, we can spell out in more detail a general characterization of the internal and external conditions of HPEs.
Internal conditions
The first question we may then ask is whether HPEs and HAEs have the same internal conditions, viz., do they have the same structure or form? In its general form, an explanation "is a set of propositions with a certain structure" (Strevens, 2013, 510 In this formulation, how the modality of the possibility operator should be interpreted is deliberately left open. This is an essential feature of the characterization I propose. Modality comes in various sorts, e.g., epistemic, metaphysical, causal, logical, nomic, etc. (see Kment, 2017) . Quite often, the possibility of scientific interest is causal and typical HPEs thus establish that 'p because q' is causally possible. Logical possibility, on the other hand, is usually not very valuable insofar as logic rules out very few empirical possibilities. To know a logical possibility may not be informative with respect to learning about empirical the world. That said, as the burgeoning literature on mathematical explanation attests (Baron et al., 2017; Lange, 2013 Lange, , 2017 Pincock, 2015) , in some cases the relevant modality may well be mathematical. My goal here is not to restrict what counts as acceptable modality in all contexts, but rather to propose a general characterization. As I will show below, many accounts of HPEs rely on an implicit or explicit notion of modality, e.g., epistemic or causal possibility. How the possibility operator is interpreted has of course significant consequences on the external-or truth-conditions of a HPE. I will discuss it in more detail below, but here it is simply important to note that a thoroughly specified HPE states the modality of the operator. What matters is that the relevant modality ultimately needs to be selected in order to assess the possibility claim.
At first sight, it may appear that my proposal is simply a more formal char- Salmon (1989, 137) and Brandon (1990, 178-179) consider consistency with known facts to be a hallmark of HPEs. On the Dray-type side, Forber (2010, 34) appeals to a "causal principle of possibility". Furthermore, HPEs usually considered in the literature (Grüne-Yanoff, 2013a) do not simply show that there is logical entailment between the explanans and the explanandum. This is too easy. Instead, they also appear to provide information about the world.
Hence, perhaps a second way of characterizing the form of the Hempel-type HPE could be that it also has the form '♦(p because q)', but the possibility operator should only receive a formal-e.g., logical-interpretation. This sort of possibility then leaves open whether the explanation is, for instance, causally possible. This characterization has the merit of highlighting the main issue with the Hempel-type HPE: it is too lax. As a matter of fact, a common worry in the HPEs literature (Brandon, 1990) 
External conditions
Typically, the external conditions for HAE require that 'p', 'q', and 'p because q' are all true. More precisely, a realist account of explanation will require that 'p'
and 'q' are true whereas an antirealist may be content if only 'p because q' is true under certain conditions. For an antirealist, the explanatory relationship may be true in the absence of true explanantia and explananda (see Khalifa, 2011 can also consider that we have no evidence that it is the HAE. In fact, we may even have evidence that some other cause is the HAE. In short, we may have zero evidence that the HPE is the actual explanation, yet still consider that it is possible. A HPE is therefore fully supported by the evidence for the specific claim it is making and this evidence may be independent of the evidence for the HAE.
The difference in external conditions with the Dray-type is more subtle as we can find various proposals for external conditions. However, some Dray-type HPEs put actuality constraints on either the explanandum or the explanans.
On one side of the spectrum, as we have seen, for Dray (1968, 399-401) a HPE identifies an actual necessary condition for the explanandum. To show that a given phenomenon was not impossible, one could not only appeal to a possible explanans. The necessary condition identified had to be actually instantiated.
This necessary condition then rebutted the presumption of impossibility. According to Dray, if only a possible necessary condition was identified, then it had to be called a 'possible explanation how-possibly'. In other words, it would have the form of a HPE, yet would not satisfy the external conditions. Under my account, a HPE may include actual elements, but does not require any.
On the other side of the spectrum, as stated earlier, Forber's global HPEs, in particular, have minimal external conditions. He holds that mere consistency with formal constraints is sufficient and that no additional empirical support is necessary. On the contrary, his local HPEs have some actuality requirements.
Only the initial conditions 'c' may be speculative, the explanandum and the generalizations being actual. He holds that local HPEs "are just-so stories that speculate about the adaptive (or non-adaptive) evolutionary history of a lineage" (Forber, 2010, 36, emphasis in original) . For him, this is not per se a problem as long as they are recognized as such.
Contrary to some versions of the Hempel-type and Dray-type, the external conditions I propose are either more or less demanding. They can be more demanding insofar as the mere logical form of an explanation is often not sufficient. A stronger modal appraisal is called for. It requires one to evaluate whether it is true that the explanans and the explanandum are possible according to a relevant modality. Contrary to some versions of the Dray-type, they can be less demanding as my account does not require any actual proposition. HPEs can include claims of actuality, but actuality is not required to establish claims of possibility.
Applying the conditions: a summary
I would like to end this discussion of the internal and external conditions of HPEs with a brief synthesis of how it helps to organize our thinking about the existing literature. Its principal virtue is to show where the differences lie between versions of HPEs. One conclusion I reach is that contemporary accounts (Brandon, 1990; Forber, 2010) are closer in terms of form than they seem to be.
Indeed, they all emphasize that the end product of a HPE is a possibility claim.
In this respect, I would say that Brandon's and Forber's accounts are similar to External conditions Account Internal cond. Possibility Actuality Dray (1957) ♦p because c Epistemic (?) p Necessary c Hempel (1965) p because q Logical -Brandon (1990) ♦(p because q) Epistemic c, 'because' q Forber (2010) ♦(p because q) Local causal c, 'because' p, q Forber (2010) ♦(p because q) Global causal p, q, c - Table 2 : An application of the conditions mine in that they take HPEs to be propositions of the form '♦(p because q)'.
Reydon's (2012) analysis of Forber's (2010) account supports this claim. Indeed,
Reydon argues that Forber's global HPEs should be seen as "genuine explanations in need of explananda", thus implying that they have the same form as HAEs.
However, they do not meet the external conditions of HAEs. 8 He also makes the case that Forber's local HPEs are in fact similar to Brandon (1990) and Resnik (1991) , that they all have the same "logical structure" (Reydon, 2012, 309) . Finally, Reydon denies that local HPEs are a species of explanation-i.e., that they actually explain-because of a lack of (complete) empirical support.
We can find more variance in what external conditions the different accounts put forward. Brandon (1990) appears to say that HPEs should include actual generalizations 'q' and that they should be epistemically possible. Forber's (2010) global HPEs should be causally possible-note the different modality-relative to the global information set, but imposes no actuality requirement. His local HPEs use the same modality, but relative to the local information set. And the explanandum and the generalizations should be actual. Table 2 summarizes the preceding discussion, which suggests two things. First, that the internal conditions intersect in significant ways. The differences are less deep than we may think. Second, that most of the disagreements are located within the external conditions. What kind of modality matters and whether there are requirements about actuality are two important sources of contention.
HPEs, models, and explanation
Since many accounts of scientific modelling rely on HPEs to appraise models, we should have a good idea of whether they are a genuine species of explanation, what sort of epistemic benefits we may expect from them, and whether scientific models can indeed provide HPEs. To answer these questions, let us first look at the last issue, namely, the relationship between models and explanations.
Models are not explanations. Explanations are simply sets of propositions satisfying the internal and external conditions stated by one's favourite theory (Strevens, 2013) . Whereas explanations are linguistic entities, models are widely viewed as being non-linguistic. This is clearly true of physical models such as the MONIAC (aka Phillips Hydraulic Computer), but also of the mathematical models usually discussed in the literature such as the Lotka-Volterra model (Weisberg, 2007) . So, when we say that a model explains a given phenomenon, what this means is that there is a given model proposition-propositions that are true within the model-according to which 'p because q' and that this proposition is epistemically related to the real-world proposition 'p because q'. When we say 'Model M explains why p with q', we must be careful to not conclude that the model is the explanation. Instead, what it means is that the model provides sufficient reasons to believe that 'p because q' is true. It is in this sense that models explain.
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Indeed, what many models do is to enable or justify the beliefs scientists have towards claims of this sort. Claveau and Vergara Fernández (2015) argue that models play an evidential role when model propositions make a difference to one's beliefs or justification for real-world propositions. When using a model, the model propositions one knows enter one's evidential network for real-world propositions. isomorphism (French and Ladyman, 1999) or similarity (Giere, 2010) . The model might be a fiction that licenses inferences to the world (Suárez, 2009) .
Solving the (difficult) problem of how model propositions can correspond or license inferences to world propositions is naturally out of the scope of this paper.
Nothing hinges on the specifics of how models provide these reasons; we only need to grant that models do play this evidential role.
Discussing one recent and influential account of models may help to see the evidential role of models and its relationship to possibility. Sugden (2000; argues, especially in his more recent work, that posited similarities between models and the world may license inductive inferences from the model to the world. For instance, Sugden describes the inductive schema of explanation where the facts that 1) the explanandum 'p' is caused by the explanans 'q' in the model world and that 2) both 'p' and 'q' occur in the world 3) provide "reason to believe" that 'p' is caused by 'q' (Sugden, 2000, 19, emphasis in original; 2013, 240) . Here the model propositions clearly enter into the modeller's evidential network. What happens in the model serves to justify the inference to the world.
While similarity is, according to Sugden, the key notion to license inductive inferences, he argues that one important dimension along which to judge it is credibility. 10 In this context, credibility means that the confidence we have in our inferences is "greater the extent to which we can understand the relevant model as a description of how the world could be" (Sugden, 2000, 24, emphasis in original) . Credibility in that sense is not about considering that the model is real, but about judging that it is compatible with one's knowledge and beliefs about the world (Sugden, 2000, 25; 2009, 18; 2011, 718) .
Using the account of HPEs developed here helps to clarify Sugden's views and the debate about them. In a discussion of Schelling's (1971; 1978) model of residential segregation, Sugden (2011) argues that the 1971 model is an "explanation in search of an observation" (2011, 722) whereas the 1978 model was really trying to tell us something about the world. In other words, the 1978 model is an explanation and the 1971 model is a potential explanation (Sugden, 2011, 734 (Sugden, 2000, 11, my emphasis; 2009, 23) . help us understand the source of the debate between Sugden and rival accounts (Aydınonat, 2007; Grüne-Yanoff, 2009; Mäki, 2009 propositions (Claveau and Vergara Fernández, 2015) . Accordingly, we should not interpret the possibility operator as directly bearing on the model propositions.
Possibility judgments are rather on the appropriate world propositions. For a given HPE of the form '♦(p because q)' to hold, it is thus not necessary that the model propositions of 'p' or 'q' are possible. It is simply required, as we have seen above, that these model propositions be part of one's evidential network for the HPE.
In fact, as Van Riel's (2015) For the machine to work, the physical laws would need to be different. These models can't of course provide HAEs, but they also can't provide HPEs, or so it seems, since the target is nomically impossible. Yet, it appears that modelling impossible targets is both a common practice and one that is epistemically And if they do not, is it then appropriate to call these both 'explanations'?
A reason we may want to say that HPEs are genuine explanations is because they may, like HAEs, afford understanding. An important epistemic goal of science is understanding. Science affords understanding of reality. One way it does so is by explaining phenomena. As van Riel notes, a prime candidate argument for the view that HPEs afford understanding is to consider they are genuine explanations. For if they explain, then surely they also afford understanding.
But it is also possible to make an argument to the effect that HPEs, while not actually explaining, afford understanding. Having a scientific explanation is a sufficient condition for scientific understanding. But is it necessary? And if propositions afford understanding, does this imply they should be qualified as an explanation? Put differently, that propositions explain is a cue that they afford understanding. However, if propositions afford understanding, is it equally a cue that they constitute an explanation? That HPEs may contribute to learning (Grüne-Yanoff, 2009 , 2013a or understanding (Rohwer and Rice, 2013; Ylikoski and Aydınonat, 2014; Rice, 2016) has some support in the literature. 14 However, granting that HPEs afford understanding does not imply they should necessarily be viewed as a species of explanation. For one, Lipton (2009) However, we would need to motivate further why they should share the genus 'explanation' with HAEs whose contribution is in many respects superior. On the other hand, if HPEs are not a species of explanation, this does not necessarily imply they can't afford, for instance, learning or understanding. Nevertheless, more would need to be said concerning the value of knowledge of possibility.
In particular, we need to understand better the conditions under which it can inform us about the world. to be reserved to HAEs-and there might be good reasons for this-, then we should better find a less confusing and more appropriate one for HPEs. While it appears safe to claim that HPEs may afford epistemic benefits in the form of learning or understanding, more work needs to be done in order to clarify how exactly knowledge of possibility can do it. But at least we now know better where to look and what to look for.
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